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This Answer is submitted pursuant to Rule 35 R. Utah S.
Ct. by Appellants, Banberry Development Corporation, Banberry
Crossing

(collectively

"Banberry")

and

Sidney

M.

Horman

( "Horman" ) in opposition to the January 30, 1990 petition for
rehearing of respondent Eugene L. Kimball ("Kimball") from this
Court's opinion of January 2, 1990.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF POSITION
Kimball's Petition for Rehearing of the January 2, 1990
Opinion consists of two arguments.

The first is that this Court

did not delineate in its opinion all of the factual claims which
Kimball believes are important to a resolution of the fraud
issue on appeal.

In advancing such argument, Kimball makes no
or misapprehended"1

the

extended factual arguments made by Kimball in the appeal.

The

showing

that this Court

"overlooked

fact that the Courtf s opinion does not track down and respond to
each one. of Kimball's "badges of fraud" arguments does not at
all suggest, much less warrant, the conclusion that the argument
was overlooked or misapprehended.
Kimball's fraud arguments in his Petition are merely
repetition

of the same

arguments made

in the main appeal.

Duplicative arguments already once rejected or determined to be
inapposite by the Court are not the proper basis of a rehearing
petition under the controlling precedent.

1

Rule 35(a) of this Court's rules requires that a petition for rehearing state
with particularity the points of law or fact which it is claimed "the court has
overlooked or misapprehended**."

Secondly,
question

of

Kimball

Horman?s

presents

and

Banberry's

"payment" issue on appeal.
Horman

and

Banberry

do

for

the

first

standing

to

time

the

raise

the

Contrary to Kimball's position,

have

interests

that

were

adversely

impacted by the "payment" verdict and judgment and both have
requisite standing to appeal.
tempted

to raise the

Beyond that, Kimball has at-

"payment" issue for the first time on

rehearing after having already taken his position and submitted
expansive argument on the merits of the "payment question" in
the main appeal.
the

Court's

Having lost that position and argument under

opinion,

Kimball

now

urges

that

there

was

no

standing or jurisdiction to raise the issue on appeal in the
first instance.

This Court has not looked with favor on such

practice or strategy.
Kimball's Petition for Rehearing is unsupported in law
and should be rejected.
POINT I.
CONTRARY TO KIMBALL'S PETITION, THE FACTS
MATERIAL TO THE RATIONALE OF THE COURT'S OPINION
WERE NOT OMITTED.
Kimball begins his argument on the erroneous note that
in a case of significant factual complexity, the Court's Opinion
spends

only

one

and

(Kimball Pet. p. 2.)

1/2

half

pages

outlining

the

facts.

Kimball argues from this that his "badges

of fraud" argument was not given appropriate weight by the Court
and that a rehearing should be granted to allow consideration of
such matters and corresponding amendment to the Court's Opinion.
2

To begin with, the Court's recital and analysis of the
facts

in

its

Opinion

surrounding

the

fraud

issue

confined to one and 1/2 pages as alleged by Kimball.

are

not

Although

it would be no diatribe if the allegation were correct, it is
not correct.

The Court's factual analysis runs throughout the

first 17 pages of the slip Opinion and is found particularly on
pages 2-3, 10-13 and 17-18.

Kimball's so-called

"badges of

fraud" are discussed generally although not, perhaps, with the
glowing tilt and the detailed labels of Kimball's argument.2
Secondly, this Court is not required to recite each and every
factual claim or argument raised in an appeal.

State v. Carter,

776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) ("This Court need not analyze and
address in writing each and every argument, issue, or claim
raised and properly before us on appeal.") (Opinion by Hall,
C.J.); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Arizona Indus. Comm'n., 90 Ariz.
379, 368 P.2d 450 (1962); Grand Lodge, Etc. v. Hermoine Lodge
No. 16, Etc., 258 Ala. 641, 64 So. 2d 405 (1952) (appellate
court not required to reproduce all of the trial evidence in its
opinion where record is voluminous).
endless if that were the case.

The judicial task would be

Rather, it is sufficient if the

Court has given reasonable consideration to the facts surrounding

the

appeal.

issues

which

the Court

determines

will

govern

the

Carter, 776 P.2d at 888-89; Phelps, 368 P.2d at 451.

January 2, 1990 Slip Opinion, pp. 4-6; 13-14.
3

In its January 2 Opinion, this Court at the threshold
focused on what it determined to be the "dispositive issue on
appeal" relative to Kimball's fraud claim.

Slip Op. at 3.

That

issue was clearly defined as one of duty -- viz. , whether a duty
existed on the part of Herman, Banberry, First Security Bank and
the

Horman

Trust

to disclose

to Kimball

the existence

contents of their settlement and purchase agreement.

and

The Court

thereupon undertook a penetrating analysis of the legal duty to
disclose

facts not only as between senior and junior lien-

holders, but also in the specific context of the facts before
the Court.
The

Court

reached

the

conclusion

that

there

was

no

special, confidential, or fiduciary duty as between Horman, the
Bank or Banberry and Kimball that would have imposed a legal
duty of disclosure.
light

of

parties.

the

The Court's conclusion was reached in full

evidence

and

the

extenuated

argument

of

the

No single piece of evidence cited by the Court in its

Opinion is alleged by Kimball to be inaccurate or unfounded.
Kimball's

argument

comes down

to no more than a desire

to

rewrite the Court's opinion so as to specifically keynote its
exaggerated

badges of

fraud

argument, without

the

slightest

showing that the Court failed to consider those claims in its
analysis of the "duty" issue.

The Court's Opinion set out a

concise but substantial exposition of the relevant, objective
facts that were reasonably required for the resolution of the

4

duty

issue.

The nature and development

of the Opinion

is

fundamentally a matter of discretion for the Court.
Part of the difficulty of Kimball's petition is that it
does not demonstrate how the end result in this appeal would
change if this Court were to somehow rewrite its Opinion to
Kimball's desire.
Utah

Salt Lake City v. Telluride Power Co., 82

622, 26 P. 2d 822

(1933).

Since the Court

found

that

resolution of the duty issue was dispositive of the appeal, Slip
Op. at 3, 13, 16, the Court found it unnecessary to address the
other elements of fraud which equally plagued Kimball's position
herein.

Kimball was faced with the obstacles of demonstrating

the nature of the false misrepresentation of fact, reliance by
Kimball, and damages, as well as how the fraud verdict could
stand against Horman and Banberry without a wholesale rewriting
of Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1953).

Lastly,

the factual hypothesis in Kimball's petition, p. 8, that the
subject settlement agreement expressly provided that it would be
kept secret until Kimball lost his lien, is, at minimum, a vast
hyperbole unsupported in the factual record.
These obstacles cannot be overcome or the exaggerated
assumptions sustained in Kimball's petition for rehearing.
should be denied.

5

It

POINT II.
HORMAN AND BANBERRY HAD STANDING TO RAISE
THE PAYMENT ISSUE ON APPEAL AND KIMBALL IS
JUDICIALLY ESTOPPED FROM ARGUING OTHERWISE.
The second point in Kimball's Petition is that Horman
and/or

Banberry

judgment

on

lacked

standing

"payment" of

to

the Bank's

appeal
senior

the

verdict

lien.

and

Lack of

standing, it is argued, deprives this Court of the power to hear
or decide the issue of payment and thus, the petition argues
that a significant portion of the Court's Opinion which addresses the "payment" issue and finds reversible error in the trial
court judgment should be reheard and set aside.
This
advanced.

is

a

new

argument

for

Kimball,

never

before

It is not only new as to the trial court proceedings,

it is new in the main appeal of this case.

Indeed, Kimball has

consistently presented argument to the trial court and to this
Court that assumed, by definition, full standing of Horman and
Banberry to raise and argue the "payment" question.
Throughout his main brief on appeal, Kimball blithely
and continually refers to Horman and not the Horman Trust as the
party who was bound by the "payment" verdict and judgment.3
Typical of those statements are the following:
. . . When payment was discovered, First Security
and Sidney Horman denied it, as they do to this
day. They refused to reconvey the First Security
trust deeds . . . They clouded Kimball's lien

3

Kimball July 22, 1988 Brief, pp. 2, 4-5, 9, 12, 23-29, 31-34, 36, 44, 51-54,
60-61, 73-74, 77, 79, 83-84, 87-91, 93.
6

from 1984 to 1987 and enjoined him from foreclosing . . .
"Hormanfs paying the First Security loans
in secret while arranging to have the Bank remain
in title to the liens and appear to foreclose its
loan . . . was a fraud on Kimball."
Kimball Resp. Br. pp. 4, 5.
1.
Clear.

Standing of Horman to Raise the Payment Question is

The legal principle of standing is well recognized in

the case precedent of this Court.

Society of

Professional

Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1987); Terracor v.
Utah Board of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986).

Standing

does not turn upon abstract or academic argument, Society of
Professional Journalists, 743 P.2d at 1174, but will be viewed
within the reality of facts as to the specific interest and
impact that the judgment will have upon the individual's interest.

Terracor, 716 P. 2d at 799.

The underlying legal policy is

thus stated by this Court:
"The doctrine of standing is intended to assure
the procedural integrity of judicial adjudication
by requiring that parties to a lawsuit have a
sufficient interest in the subject matter of the
dispute and sufficient adverseness that the legal
and factual issues which must be resolved must be
thoroughly explored."
Id. at 798.
Kimball is in error in arguing that the "payment" verdict
and judgment in the trial court had no adverse impact upon
Sidney M. Horman.

In law, Horman had standing to appeal the

payment verdict to this Court for a number of reasons.

To begin

with, Horman was directly and adversely affected by the "pay7

ment" judgment, because the finding of payment was absolutely
essential to Kimball's fraud claim against Horman.

Kimball's

alleged claim of fraudulent concealment was premised on the
argument that the Bank's liens were extinguished by the undisclosed

"payment" agreement.

Horman thus had standing to

appeal the fraud verdict and to challenge the underlying payment
verdict.
Moreover, the transaction between the Bank and the Horman
Trust, through Sidney Horman as trustee, was part of a larger
settlement agreement involving other properties in which Horman
and the Banberry interests were involved.

The "payment" verdict

and judgment had an impact upon the larger settlement agreement
that would be binding upon both Horman and the Banberry interests.
Furthermore, Horman was sued, appeared and defended in
the case on the question of "payment."

He was alleged to be the

alter-ego of the Trust and Banberry and the Trust was impacted
to that extent.

Horman was seriously prejudiced by the payment

verdict, for if allowed to stand, it meant that the Horman Trust
would have delivered $1,600,000 to the Bank for the purchase of
the Bank's senior lien rights, without receiving any consideration therefor.
Additionally, Horman was significantly prejudiced by the
"payment" verdict for purposes of res judicata.

If the "pay-

ment" judgment had not been reversed by this Court for prejudicial error in the instructions to the jury, there is little
8

doubt

that Kimball would have taken the position that said

verdict and judgment would be res judicata to Horman in his
individual, as well as his fiduciary, capacity as trustee for
the Horman Trust.

Therefore, the Trust may be bound by the

payment verdict because the trustee was before the trial court
and defended against Kimball's "payment" claim.4
Both Banberry

and Horman had

standing

to appeal

the

"payment" verdict and judgment because of the First Jury Verdict
which this Court, on appeal, found to be prejudicial and reversible error.

Interrogatory No. 4 of the First Special Verdict

questioned the jury as to whether "the transfer of $1.6 million
to First Security Bank and First Security Financial constituted
a 'payment' from Banberry Crossing to First Security Bank and
FSF of the trust deed notes?"

(Emphasis added.)

(See Attach-

ment 1. )
This Court, in its January 2, 1990 Opinion at p. 21,
found that special verdict to be prejudicial error, because even
if there were a "payment" rather than "purchase" of the trust
deed notes, the payment under all of the evidence did not come
from Banberry.

See Slip Op. at 21.

Clearly, Banberry had

standing to appeal the special verdict on

4

"payment" against

Provident Tradesmens B. & T. Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968)
(Appellate Court should protect an absent party whose interest may be affected by
a judgment that as a practical matter impairs or impedes its ability to protect its
interest); Hendrick v. Mitchell, 320 Mass. 155, 69 N.E.2d 466 (1946) (Trustee had
standing to appeal an order advantageous to a trust where it exposed trustee to
potential liability).
9

which it had defended and lost.

Horman was the "common factor"

between Banberry and the Trust and he, as well, was prejudicially impacted and had standing to appeal the First Jury Verdict on
"payment".
Lastly, both Horman and Banberry had standing to appeal
the payment verdict because of its prejudicial impact upon the
subsequent fraud instructions, Instruction No. 19 in particular.
In the Second Jury Verdict and at Kimball's request, the trial
court charged the jury that for the purpose of determining the
culpability of Horman and Banberry for the alleged fraud, the
October 1984 agreements were between the Bank, Banberry, Sidney
Horman

and

others.

The very

integration

of

the

"payment"

verdict as part of the "fraud" verdict against Sidney M. Horman
and Banberry provided more than the requisite standing in which
to appeal the "payment" verdict and judgment.
The public policy underlying the standing principle is
fully served by the appeal on the "payment" verdict and judgment.

If this Court's opinion on the "payment" verdict were

now reversed on rehearing, First Security could not perform
under its settlement agreement with the Banberry parties and the
Trust.
exposed

The

Trust

could

to potential

be

irreparably

liability

damaged

as trustee.

and

Horman

On this point,

alone, Horman has standing under the precedent of Terracor to
challenge the "payment" verdict and judgment.
2.

Kimball's Claim as to Standing on Rehearing is the

Categorical Antithesis of His Argument Below and in the Main
10

Appeal.

In making his argument on standing, Kimball was aware

of the ruling case law of this Court that new issues may not be
raised for the first time on rehearing.

As Justice Oaks wrote

for a unanimous Court in Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678,
681 (Utah 1982):
"A losing party cannot use a petition for rehearing 'to present to this court a new theory or
contention which was neither in the record as it
was before this court, nor in the arguments
made f". (Citing authority. )
Kimball acknowledges the lateness of his argument but
apologetically urges that this is an "exceptional circumstance,"
citing Jollivet v. Cook.5

The only "exceptional circumstance"

involving the standing question is that it is first raised in a
rehearing petition of an appeal in which the party had taken the
opposite position, argued and lost the appealed issue.
essence of Kimball's proposition is simple.

The

It is that he may

make an elaborate argument on the substantive merits of the
"payment" question in the main appeal, lose on that question and
then turn around on rehearing and argue for the first time that
there was no standing to address the "payment" issue and argument in the first place.
Kimball spent nearly 40 pages of his main brief on appeal
on the "payment" question, urging that Horman as the alter-ego
of Banberry, used the Horman Trust as a

"straw man," or a

"dummy," or as his alter-ego in making the alleged "payment" to

784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 751 (1990).
11

the Bank discharging the latterfs senior liens.

During the

trial before the lower court, in resisting a motion bT^ the
defendants that Kimball had failed to join the Horman Trust as
an indispensable party, Kimball resisted, arguing that it was
sufficient for the trial court's jurisdiction on the question of
"payment" that Horman was before the Court as the alter-ego of
the Trust and Banberry.6
How is it that Kimball is able to make such a vigorous
argument on the merits of the "payment" issue on appeal herein
and then having lost thereon, now urges on rehearing the lack of
legal standing to make the argument?

If Kimball had prevailed

before this Court on the "payment" question, would he be here on
rehearing urging the Court to set aside and vacate its opinion
for lack of standing?
It is to preclude a party from engaging in such inconsistent conduct that the doctrine of judicial estoppel has been
recognized before this Court.

As Justice Crockett put it in his

concurrence on a denial of a petition for rehearing:
11

. . . it is totally foreign to my conception of
fairness and justice for a party to submit his
controversy to a court for adjudication, then
wait to see whether he wins or loses, and when he
loses to then attack the composition of the
court. That this may not properly be done, see
. . . citing authorities . . . "
Shippers Best Express, Inc. v. Newsome, 579 P.2d
1978).

1316 (Utah

R. 4948, Argument of Kimball's counsel at May 14, 1986 hearing, Tr. 8-11.
12

Justice Maughan of this Court expressed the policy behind
judicial estoppel -- "the prevention of toying with judicial
process."

He stated:

For my view, such toying occurs when a litigant
is allowed success while maintaining inconsistent
positions.
The maxim ? one cannot blow hot and cold in the
same breath' finds its expression in the doctrine
of judicial estoppel. A litigant is not allowed
to maintain inconsistent positions in judicial
proceedings.
Royal Resources v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 797 (Utah
1979) (Maughan, J., dissenting).
Kimball filed his main brief in this case subject to the
sanctions of Rule 11 as incorporated in Supreme Court Rule 40(a)
acknowledging
standing.

that the

"payment" argument had the requisite

He is now estopped from arguing a contrary position

for the first time in a petition for rehearing as to an issue
which was lost in the main appeal.
Kimball's argument on standing cannot be saved by the
Court

exercising

its

question of standing.

authority,

sua

sponte,

to

review

the

As has been demonstrated above, both

Horman and Banberry were adversely impacted by the "payment"
verdict in a number of ways and both had standing to bring that
issue

before

this Court

on appeal.

Kimball's

argument

on

standing is fraught with difficulty and should be rejected.
CONCLUSION
Kimball's petition for rehearing, apart from the issue
of standing, is a reargument of issues that have already been
13

fully evaluated and resolved by the Court's opinion of January
2, 1990.
argument

Kimball does not make out even the most marginal
that

this

Court

has

overlooked

or

misinterpreted

critical and relevant facts to the issues which it found were
dispositive of the appeal.

Kimball's argument on standing is

abortive for several reasons and should be rejected.
The

petition

for

rehearing

should

be

denied

in

all

respects, it is
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT S. C'AtoPBSWf JR.

<£/

L
E. BARNEY GESJ
of and for
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Sidney M. Horman and
the Banberry Parties
February 27, 1990
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Attachment 1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD- JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FIRST SECURITY BANK OF
UTAH, N.A., and FIRST
SECURITY FINANCIAL,
FIRST SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL NO.

vs.

7457

BANBERRY CROSSING, EUGENE R.
KIMBALL, et al.,
No.
Defendants.

FILED
M Y 21 1903

EUGENE L. KIMBALL,

CJ#ri of Summit Cowa+y

Cross-Claimant,

IY....W
bVpu^'cM

vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, DON
HUTCHISON and COMMONWEALTH
LAND TITLE COMPANY,
Cross-Defendants.

We, the jury, find the following answers to the questions
propounded to us in accordance with the Court's instructions:
1.

Did Summit County Title comply with the instructions

of Kimball in the May 8, 1981 (Exhibit t3°f\
(Exhibit #4«c>8) letters?
Yes

Ho

X

) and July 8, 1981

2
(a) If you have answered question No. 1 "no," please
answer this question:
Did Eugene L. Kimball release Summit County Title
Company from performance of the instructiort?
AhtL

2

*

Was s dn

* *y M* Hornan the alter ego of Banberry Crossing

or Banberry Development Corp. when the Purchase Agreement (Exhibit
#K>t6 ) was made in October of 1984?
Yee X
3.

No

Was Sidney M. Horman the alter ego of the Horman Family

Trust when the Purchase Agreement (Exhibit # |o^8 ) was made
in October of 1984?

Yes
4.

No X

In l i g h t of the Court's i n s t r u c t i o n relating to the

Purchase Agreement (Exhibit # i o t s ) and "payment" heretofore
given t o you, did the transfer of $1.6 million t o First Security
Bank and F i r s t S e c u r i t y Financial constitute a "payment" from
Banberry Crossing t o F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank and F i r s t Security
Financial of the t r u s t deed notes?
Yes_iC-

Dated this }C

No

dav of May, 1986.

FOREPERSON

